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Abstract
In a search and matching model with right-to-manage bargaining, matched workers
and ﬁrms bargain over wages, given labor demand schedule of ﬁrms for hours worked per
worker. Wages and hours worked per worker are determined as if they are determined
in a competitive labor market with a distortion to wage markups. A positive ineﬃciency
gap in the labor market diminishes workers' eﬀective bargaining power relative to ﬁrms,
because ﬁrms can adjust labor input and wage schedule via intensive margin. The Hosios
condition does not necessarily hold even when workers' actual bargaining power is equal to
unemployment elasticity of matches.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the standard labor market search model based on eﬃcient Nash bargaining, workers and
ﬁrms bargain over both wages and hours worked per worker. Hosios (1990) showed that if
workers' bargaining power is equal to unemployment elasticity of matches, the allocation in a
decentralized economy is eﬃcient. The marginal product of labor is equal to the marginal rate
of substitution at an eﬃcient level of hours worked per worker (intensive margin) as in the social
planner's problem, and wage contracts with a particular share of surplus assures that wages are
also at an eﬃcient level. Thus the number of jobs (extensive margin) is also at an eﬃcient
level. In contrast, in recently investigations of right-to-manage bargaining, in which matched
workers and ﬁrms bargain over wages, given labor demand schedule of ﬁrms for hours worked
per worker, the properties of the model in terms of ineﬃciencies in the labor market have not
been studied.1
In this note, I describe properties of the labor market search model with the right-to-manage
bargaining, as well as the implied ineﬃciencies in the labor market. The most distinct feature
I found is that wages and hours worked per worker are determined as if they are determined
by demand and supply in a competitive labor market with a distortion to wage markups. A
positive ineﬃciency gap (Galí, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido, 2007) in the labor market diminishes
workers' eﬀective bargaining power relative to ﬁrms because ﬁrms can adjust labor input and
wage schedule via intensive margin. The Hosios condition does not necessarily hold even when
workers' actual bargaining power is equal to unemployment elasticity of matches. Workers'
bargaining power and wage markups are closely related to each other through ineﬃciencies in
the labor market.
In the next section, I present the model. Section 3 shows the results in steady state. Section
4 concludes.
2 MODEL
Time is discrete and inﬁnite, t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. There is an inﬁnite mass of workers and ﬁrms.
Firms post vacancies to workers seeking jobs. Wages and hours worked per worker are de-
1The original contributions are found in Nickell and Andrews (1983) and Trigari (2006). Christoﬀel and
Kuester (2008) and Christoﬀel and Linzert (2010) studied inﬂation dynamics of a version of the model with sticky
price and monopolistic competition. Christoﬀel and Kuester (2009) also examined the elasticity of unemployment
with respect to ﬁrms' beneﬁts in the model.
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termined via right-to-manage bargaining (Nickell and Andrews, 1983; Trigari, 2006), in which
matched worker and ﬁrm bargain over wages, given labor's demand schedule of ﬁrms. The
timing of events is as follows:
1. 1 − nt−1 is the measure of unemployed workers at the end of last period. A fraction of
the employed workers ρnt−1 are exogenously separated:
ut = 1− nt−1 + ρnt−1. (1)
ut workers seek jobs in this period.
2. Firms post vacancies vt to match the unemployed workers ut by matching function
m(ut, vt), which exhibits constant returns to scale. The labor market tightness is given
by
θt = vt/ut. (2)
Each worker and ﬁrm is as small as such the labor market tightness at the aggregate level
is given for them. The job ﬁnding rate for workers s(θt) = m(ut, vt)/ut = m(1, θt) and
the job ﬁlling rate for ﬁrms q(θt) = m(ut, vt)/vt = m(θ−1t , 1) are also given for them.
3. The number of the newly employed workers is given by
nt = (1− ρ)nt−1 +m(ut, vt). (3)
Note that the newly employed workers can work immediately.
4. The employed workers enter into production
yt = f(ht)nt. (4)
Each worker works ht hours and produces f(ht) which is decreasing returns to scale in
terms of hours worked per worker so that ﬁrms earn a positive proﬁt period-by-period.
Total production is linear in nt.
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Matching values for workers and ﬁrms are given by
St = wtht − g(ht)/pt − b+ β(1− ρ)(1− s(θt+1))pt+1
pt
St+1, (5)
Jt = f(ht)− wtht + β(1− ρ)pt+1
pt
Jt+1, (6)
where St is the matching value for a marginal worker in terms of utility and Jt is the matching
value for a marginal job. Each Worker earns wage bill wtht. A worker also has disutility of
labor g(ht)/pt and forgone unemployed beneﬁts b. 1−ρ(1−s(θt+1)) employed workers continue
to match with ﬁrms in the next period, and s(θt+1) unemployed workers ﬁnd a job in the next
period, thus their diﬀerence is used as transition probability of net value of employment.2 Each
ﬁrm produces f(ht) and pays wage bill wtht. ρ jobs are exogenously separated in the next
period. pt = c−1t is the price in terms of numeraire (log utility of household consumption is
assumed). Free entry is assumed, i.e.,
Jt =
cv
q(θt)
. (7)
The value of a job is equal to the vacancy posting cost cv times expected vacancy duration
1/q(θt).
Right-to-manage bargaining In right-to-manage bargaining, ﬁrms have control over hours
worked per worker, and maximize the matching value for ﬁrms, i.e. ∂Jt/∂ht = f ′(ht)−wt = 0.
This condition can be solved for hours worked per worker, ht = f ′−1(wt) ≡ h(wt). Given
this labor demand schedule, workers and ﬁrms bargain over wages period-by-period so as to
maximize joint surplus Sηt J
1−η
t , where η ∈ [0, 1] is workers' actual bargaining power. The
ﬁrst-order necessary condition with respect to the wage is given by
η
∂St
∂wt
Jt + (1− η) ∂Jt
∂wt
St = 0,
⇔ δt ≡ −(∂St/∂wt)/(∂Jt/∂wt) = [(1− η)/η]St/Jt,
2The matching value for workers is decomposed into St ≡Wt −Ut where Wt = wtht + β(pt+1/pt)[(1− ρ(1−
st+1))Wt+1 +ρ(1−st+1)Ut+1] and Ut = g(ht)/pt+b+β(pt+1/pt)[st+1Wt+1 +(1−st+1)Ut+1]. Employed workers
obtain wage bill wtht, and remain in their job in the next period with probability 1− ρ(1− st+1). Unemployed
workers have foregone labor disutility and unemployment beneﬁts g(ht)/pt + b, and ﬁnd a job in the next period
with probability st+1.
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where δt = −(∂St/∂wt)/(∂Jt/∂wt) = 1−εw(g′(ht)ct/wt−1) is the wedge between the marginal
values of matching and εw = −h′(wt)wt/h(wt) > 1 is elasticity of labor demand.3 By solving
δt for wt, I have the following labor market conditions:
wt = f ′(ht), (8)
wt = [εw/(εw − 1 + δt)]g′(ht)ct, (9)
where ﬁrms' labor demand schedule is given by (8). Also, through wage contracts between
workers and ﬁrms, workers' labor supply schedule is given by (9). Wages and hours worked
per worker are determined as if they are determined in a competitive labor market with a
distortion to wage markups. However, the wage markups are determined endogenously here
depending on the matching values of workers and ﬁrms; σt = εw/(εw − 1 + δt) and δt =
−(∂St/∂wt)/(∂Jt/∂wt) = [(1− η)/η]St/Jt.4
Finally, a general equilibrium is deﬁned by equations (1)-(9).
Reservation wage bills are derived from St ≥ 0 and Jt ≥ 0
ωt = g(ht)/pt + b− β(1− ρ)(1− s(θt+1))
pt+1
pt
St+1, (10)
ωt = f(ht) + β(1− ρ)pt+1
pt
Jt+1. (11)
As long as the wage bill is in the set [ωt, ωt], the continuity of matching is satisﬁed. Then, the
wage equation is derived from equations (8)-(11):
wtht = χtωt + (1− χt)ωt,
where χt = ηδt/(1− η + ηδt) is workers' eﬀective bargaining power.
3This is closely related to the labor wedge between marginal product of labor and marginal rate of substitution
at individual level. If δt = 1, wt/[g
′(ht)ct] = f ′(ht)/[g′(ht)ct] ≡ mplt/mrst = 1 also holds. In contrast, in the
eﬃcient Nash bargaining, in which workers and ﬁrms bargain both wages and hours worked per worker, δt = 1∀t
holds and no labor wedge exists at individual level.
4Note that even if St/Jt is small, (1− η)/η and δt = −(∂St/∂wt)/(∂Jt/∂wt) = [(1− η)/η]St/Jt can be large.
St/Jt is concave in wt; therefore when St/Jt is small, ∂St/∂wt is large relative to ∂Jt/∂wt and δt is large. See
also the numerical example in section 3.
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Eﬃciency The social planner's problem is given by
max
∞∑
t=0
βt (log ct − g(ht)(1− nt)) ,
s.t. ct + cvvt ≤ f(ht)nt + b(1− nt),
nt = (1− ρ)nt−1 +m(ut, vt),
where ut = 1− nt−1 + ρnt−1. First-order necessary conditions are
cv
mvt
= f(ht) + g(ht)ct − b+ β(1− ρ)(1−mut+1) ct
ct+1
cv
mvt+1
,
f ′(ht) = g′(ht)ct.
On the other hand, the implementability conditions in the decentralized economy are derived
from (5)-(9):
1
1− χt
cv
q(θt)
= f(ht) + g(ht)/pt − b
+β(1− ρ)[1− χt+1s(θt+1)]pt+1
pt
1
1− χt+1
cv
q(θt+1)
,
f ′(ht) = σtg′(ht)ct
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale matching function m(ut, vt) = mu
ξ
tv
1−ξ
t ,
mut = ξmt/ut and mvt = (1− ξ)mt/vt hold. Then I have a modiﬁed Hosios condition: ξ = η =
χt. Hosios (1990) showed that if workers' bargaining power is equal to unemployment elasticity
of matches, the allocation in the decentralized economy as described above is at eﬃcient level
as in the social planner's problem. However, the standard Hosios condition does not necessarily
hold; in general, η 6= χ and δ 6= 1 hold even in steady state. I will demonstrate it in section 3
too.
The role of workers' bargaining power In the right-to-manage bargaining, the workers'
bargaining power is diminished because ﬁrms have control over hours worked per worker. Still,
the workers' bargaining power plays an important role in the labor market. When the workers'
actual bargaining power η is low, wages are lower than the marginal rate of substitution wt =
mplt < mrst, and the marginal gain for workers by increase in wages is higher than the marginal
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loss for ﬁrms, i.e. ∂St/∂wt = ht − h′(wt)(mrst − wt) > ht = −∂Jt/∂wt.5 Thus δt is high and
σt is low. On the contrary, when the workers' bargaining power is high, wt = mplt > mrst and
∂St/∂wt < ht = ∂Jt/∂wt hold, and δt is low and σt is high. As η → 1, the slope of the supply
curve σt becomes steeper and δt approaches to zero.
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Put diﬀerently, the wage markup σt and the wedge between the marginal values of matching
δt = −(∂St/∂wt)/(∂Jt/∂wt) > 0 have an one-to-one correspondence:
σt = εw/(εw − 1 + δt)

> 1 if δt ∈ (0, 1),
= 1 if δt = 1,
< 1 if δt ∈ (1,∞).
Figure 1 graphically shows how wages and hours worked per worker (w, h) are determined. In
the eﬃcient Nash bargaining, hours worked per worker is at an eﬃcient level h = hEB = h∗.
Wages are determined independently at w = wEB, and if the workers' bargaining power is equal
to unemployment elasticity of matches, wages are also eﬃcient at the point E0 in ﬁgure 1,
(w∗, h∗). On the other hand, in right-to-manage bargaining, given labor demand schedule of
ﬁrms, the bargaining process between workers and ﬁrms determines the labor supply schedule,
which shifts with a varying wage markup σt. The equilibrium is the intersection of demand and
supply at the point E1 in ﬁgure 1, (wRTM, hRTM). When η is high, there is a positive ineﬃciency
gap in the labor market (Galí, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido, 2007), and a positive wage markup.
When η is low, there is a negative ineﬃciency gap, which leads to a negative wage markup.
Also, the workers' eﬀective bargaining power χt is given as a function of δt:
χt = ηδt/(1− η + ηδt)

< η if δt ∈ (0, 1),
= η if δt = 1,
> η if δt ∈ (1,∞).
When η is high (low), a positive (negative) ineﬃciency gap implies that the eﬀective bargaining
power χt is lower (higher) than the actual bargaining power η, because ﬁrms have control over
5In the standard eﬃcient bargaining, ∂St/∂wt = −∂Jt/∂wt = ht holds, and marginal gain and loss by
increase in wages are always the same for workers and ﬁrms.
6Note that when η = 1, ∂St/∂wt = ht + wth
′(wt)−mrsth′(wt) = 0⇔ wt = [εw/(εw − 1)]mrst holds.
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hours worked per worker and ﬁrms can aﬀect on the outcome of bargaining by adjusting labor
demand via intensive margin. Thus, because of ineﬃciencies in the labor market, the Hosios
condition does not necessarily hold.
[Figure 1 is inserted here]
3 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE IN STEADY STATE
To further investigate the steady state relationship, functional forms are assumed as follows:
m(ut, vt) = mu
ξ
tv
1−ξ
t , f(ht) = h
α
t , and g(ht) = κh
1+φ
t /(1 + φ). Unemployment beneﬁts are
proportional to wage bill, b = bwwh. By solving S and J for the underlying parameters, δ and
χ can be written as a function of the workers' actual bargaining power η ∈ [0, 1]:
δ(η) =
(1− η)A
ηB + (1− η)C ,
χ(η) =
ηA
η(A+B) + (1− η)C .
where A = [(1 + φ)(1 − bw) − α][1 − β(1 − ρ)]α, B = [1 − β(1 − ρ)(1 − s)](1 + φ)(1 − α), and
C = [1− β(1− ρ)](1−α)α. Note that under standard assumptions on parameters, β, ρ, s, α, bw
are in (0, 1) and φ > 0, B > 0 and C > 0 hold.7 Then I can show
Proposition 1. (a) If (1+φ)(1−bw) ∈ (α, 1), δ(0) = δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) holds. (b) If (1+φ)(1−bw) > 1,
δ¯ > 1 holds. Also, there is a threshold η˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that χ ≤ η if η ≥ η˜.
Proof. (a) If (1 + φ)(1 − bw) > α ⇒ A = [(1 + φ)(1 − bw) − α]C/(1 − α) > 0, δ(0) = A/C =
[(1+φ)(1− bw)−α]/(1−α) = δ¯ > 0 holds.8 (b) If (1+φ)(1− bw) > 1, δ¯ = A/C > 1 also holds.
Solving η˜ = χ(η˜) for η˜, I have η˜ = (A−C)/(A−C+B). Note that if δ¯ = A/C > 1⇒ A−C > 0,
η˜ ∈ (0, 1) also holds.
If (1+φ)(1− bw) > α, the workers' period-by-period gain from bargaining is positive, which
is required for incentive compatibility for workers to hold.9 In this case, wages and hours worked
7s = m/u = ρn/(1− n+ ρn) is a function of ρ and n = 1− u˜, where u˜ is the steady state unemployment at
the end of the period. Steady state calculation is found in the appendix.
8δ(1) = 0 and χ(0) = 0 are immediately obtained. Also, if A > 0, χ(1) = A/(A+B) ∈ (0, 1) holds. Further,
∂δ(η)/∂η ∝ −A(ηB + (1 − η)C) − (1 − η)A(B − C) = −AB < 0 and ∂χ(η)/∂η ∝ A(η(A + B) + (1 − η)C) −
ηA(A+B − C) = AC > 0 also hold.
9Otherwise, δ¯ < 0 and S/J < 0 hold. Note that J ∝ f(h)− wh = f(h)[1− f ′(h)h/f(h)] > 0 for any h > 0.
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per worker are determined at the intersection of demand (8) and supply (9). Furthermore, if
(1+φ)(1− bw) > 1, for some η there exists a threshold of workers' bargaining power η˜ = η = χ,
i.e. the actual bargaining power is equal to the eﬀective bargaining power as in the standard
model. If and only if ξ = η = η˜ = χ, the Hosios condition holds at steady state. When η > η˜,
there is a positive ineﬃciency gap and δ < 1, σ > 1 and χ < η hold.
The top panel in ﬁgure 2 shows δ(η) in steady state with the calibrated parameters.10 Note
that the latter condition (b) is satisﬁed with these parameters. As shown in proposition 1,
δ(0) = δ¯ > 1, and δ(η) is decreasing in η and converges to zero as η → 1. The second panel
in ﬁgure 2 shows that σ(η) = εw/(εw − 1 + δ(η)) is increasing in η and converges to its upper
bound σ(1) = εw/(εw−1) as η → 1. The third panel in ﬁgure 2 shows that χ is not as high as η
as η → 1. Even when η = 1, workers can get only a fraction of ﬁrms' surplus, because ﬁrms can
adjust labor input by intensive margin to insure positive period-by-period proﬁt f(h)(1−α) > 0.
In the bottom panel, S/J is increasing as η → 1, because S/J is an increasing function of wages
and workers can earn more wages by a higher bargaining power. The marginal value obtained
by increasing wages δ = −(∂S/∂w)/(∂J/∂w), however, decreases as η → 1, because S/J is
also concave in w due to labor demand schedule h(w). Last but not least, the Hosios condition
does not necessarily hold with the calibrated parameters. There is only one parameter set with
ξ = η = η˜ = 0.3 where the eﬃciency in the labor market is restored, namely δ = σ = 1.11
[Figure 2 is inserted here]
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this note, I presented the property of eﬃciencies in the labor market search model with
right-to-manage bargaining. Wages and hours worked replicates the allocation in the Walrasian
labor market with a variable wage markup. Because of ineﬃciencies in the labor market, the
Hosios condition does not necessarily hold. Workers' bargaining power and wage markups are
closely related to each other by exploiting ineﬃciencies in the labor market.
10I follow the calibration strategy in Christoﬀel and Kuester (2008; 2009), which is found in the appendix.
11η˜ is a function of the parameters other than ξ and η, therefore ξ = η = η˜ can be chosen if the other
parameters are ﬁxed. This is more restricted than in the standard case with eﬃcient Nash bargaining, where
ξ = η can be chosen freely regardless of the other parameters.
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APPENDIX
Given steady state unemployment at the end of period u˜ = 1− n, steady state job ﬁnding rate
is s = m/u = ρn/(1−n+ ρn). By normalizing h, wh = αhα and b = bwwh are obtained. Then
steady state matching values are
J = (1/α− 1)/[1− β(1− ρ)]wh,
S = [1− bw − σ−1/(1 + φ)]/[1− β(1− ρ)(1− s)]wh
where σ = εw/(εw−1+δ) = 1/[1− (1−α)(1−δ)] and δ = [(1−η)/η]S/J . These equations can
be solved for δ. Decreasing returns to scale in hours worked per worker α < 1 is assumed so that
10
ﬁrms earn positive proﬁt period-by-period J > 0 and εw = −h′(w)w/h(w) = 1/(1 − α) < ∞.
Given steady state job ﬁlling rate q, steady state vacancy cost is cv = qJ .
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Figure 1: Labor market equilibrium.
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Notes: EB denotes allocation in eﬃcient Nash bargaining. RTM denotes allocation in right-to-manage
bargaining. * denotes allocation at the social optimum.
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Figure 2: Steady state relationship.
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Notes: The parameter values other than η are ﬁxed at β = 0.998, ρ = 0.03, α = 0.95, φ = 2, bw = 0.4,
and ξ = 0.5. The length of period is a month, and parameters are chosen to match steady state
unemployment rate after matching 1 − n = 0.06 and job ﬁnding rate q = 0.3306 in the U.S. labor
market, which implies s = 0.2126 and cv = 0.047y.
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